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ABSTRACT
The Relationship between Managerial Holdings and Performance:
An Empirical Study on the Restaurant Industry
by
Young Kwi Kim
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The relationship between managerial stock holdings and performance, 
measured by profitability, operating efficiency, and stock return, was examined 
for the publicly traded restaurant companies during the period of 1995-1996. 
Additionally, the study investigated whether the degree of association between 
managerial ownership and performance, as measured by the same variables, 
differs across three groups identified by the range of managerial ownership.
The empirical results support that managerial ownership has a positive 
impact on most of the performance variables (i.e. operating efficiency and 
profitability). Firm size, a control variable, was also found to be significantly 
associated with profitability, operating efficiency, and stock return. The impact 
of managerial ownership on performance variables was most evident in the
iii
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group with 0%-15% managerial ownership. The results suggest that large 
restaurant firms with relatively low managerial ownership may utilize equity 
ownership most effectively as a managerial incentive to improve performance.
IV
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The goal of corporations is to maximize the return to owners or 
shareholders. Most corporations, however, due to separation of ownership and 
management, may not maximize the return to shareholders. As stressed by 
Berle and Means (1932), when managers hold little equity in the firm, corporate 
assets may be deployed to benefit managers rather than shareholders. This is 
why the owner (a principal) establishes incentives for the manager (an agent) so 
that the m anager can make optimal decisions from the owner's viewpoint. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), who systematically developed the agency concept, 
proposed managerial stock ownership as one way of reducing the agency 
problems that arise from the ownership-management separated structure. They 
suggested that increasing managerial stock ownership would help managers 
maximize security returns and financial performance from the shareholder's 
point of view rather than concentrate on the short-term managerial tasks.
Most publicly traded restaurant firms provide managerial ownership in 
the hope that equity ownership derives various benefits for the firm as explained 
below. First, equity ownership may increase the convergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders as Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested.
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2Restaurant firms offering managerial ownership, therefore, may anticipate 
increased returns to shareholders. Second, ownership may strengthen 
attachment and bonding of executives to the firm. It is likely that a sense of 
ownership reduces unnecessary costs that m ight have been incurred without it 
and increases the efficiency of operating/m anaging activities. This will result in 
improved firm performance. Equity ownership can be also utilized as a 
recruiting strategy for qualified restaurant executives. Today, restaurant 
executives' search for equity ownership is noticeable whether it is through stock 
options, partnership, or by other means of acquiring more equity. By identifying 
the prospective executives' "need" for equity, a restaurant firm can utilize equity 
ownership as a pro-active recruiting strategy.
Many restaurant firms, acknowledging these benefits and the industry 
trend, have adopted or are willing to adopt managerial ownership as a strategy 
to motivate their executives. A survey by Restaurant Business in 1993 indicates 
the weight of stock options in the restaurant executives' compensation (Romeo, 
1994). The survey shows that the average stock option and long-term incentive 
for all 90 restaurant CEOs constitute 70% of their total compensation. Executives 
and top management are the most im portant parts of the restaurant firm's 
human resources. Their leadership and ability are critical to a restaurant firm's 
growth and survival in this highly competitive industry. Accordingly, the 
subject of executives' equity ownership, as a motivational factor, has gained 
wide attention throughout the industry and academia.
However, the compensation for restaurant CEOs lagged far behind in
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31994, compared with the pay of other industries. According to a study by Pearl 
Meyer and Partner (as cited in Romeo and Coeyman, 1995), the average CECXs 
compensation in the U.S. was $3.5 million in 1994, up from $2.5 million in 1989. 
Comparatively, for the 100 highest paid CEOs of public restaurant companies, 
the mean was a mere $611,315 (Romeo and Coeyman, 1995). The relatively low 
compensation packages for restaurant CEOs may incite the restaurant industry 
to increase incentives for CEOs. Yet, this suggestion m ust be considered 
carefully and based on a proven track of association between incentives and firm 
performance of the restaurant companies.
Numerous studies to determine the relationship between managerial 
stock ownership and firm performance have been conducted; yet these studies 
that focused on multiple industries or single non-hospitality industry have 
yielded inconclusive results. Some studies (Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd, 1992; 
Kim, Lee, and Francis, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) found that there 
was a significant relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. On the other hand, some other studies (Demsetz, 1983; Gomez- 
Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein, 1986; Tsetsekos and 
DeFusco, 1990) failed to discover a significant relationship between them. None 
of these studies focused on the restaurant industry. Kesner's (1987) study that 
found that the impact of managerial holdings on firm performance varies among 
different industries, suggests that focusing on one industry or similar industries 
is necessary to eliminate possible industry effect
This thesis, based on the agency theory, examines the relationship
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between managerial ownership and firm performance of the publicly traded 
restaurant firms, inclusive of all types of operation. The findings of the study 
will provide empirical evidence and suggestions as to w hether establishing and 
increasing m anagerial ownership is a valid strategy in the restaurant industry to 
improve firm performance and increase the return to shareholders.
Organization of the Study
This study is designed to investigate the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance based on the agency theory. Chapter I 
addresses purpose, contribution of the study, limitations, delimitations, and 
definition of terms. Chapter II reviews background theories and empirical 
studies related to the study on the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance. Chapter HI discusses data, variables, and research 
hypotheses testing, and provides a preliminary test C hapter IV reports findings 
of the empirical investigation and analyzes the results. Finally, Chapter V 
presents a summary, discusses implications of the results, and provides 
suggestions for further research.
Purpose of the Study
The prim ary purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of 
managerial ownership on firm performance in terms of asset utilization, 
profitability, operating efficiency, and stock return. The findings will help the 
restaurant industry by setting a guideline for adopting and increasing 
managerial ownership as a competitive strategy to im prove firm performance
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5and increase the return to shareholders. To accomplish this purpose, the study 
will first examine the current status of managerial ownership within the 
restaurant industry. This examination will provide a perspective of managerial 
ownership within the overall restaurant industry. This perspective can then be 
utilized in this study as an industry standard to which individual restaurant 
firms can be compared. In addition, the study will investigate whether the 
degree of association between managerial ownership and performance, as 
measured by the same variables, varies across firms with the different levels of 
managerial ownership. The result will help to determine whether the effect of 
increasing managerial ownership is different among firms with different levels 
of managerial ownership.
Contribution of the Study
Despite the volume of the studies conducted so far, there has not been a 
conclusive result on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. Some studies (Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd, 1992; Kim, Lee, and 
Francis, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) found a significant relationship 
between managerial ownership and performance, while some others (Demsetz, 
1983; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein, 1986; 
Tsetsekos and DeFusco, 1990) failed to discover the significant relationship. This 
study will add additional evidence and contribute to narrowing the gap among 
the previous studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance.
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
Most previous studies that investigated the impact of managerial 
ownership on firm performance have used diverse industries as samples. While 
some studies focused on single non-hospitality industry such as manufacturing 
and utility, the others collected samples by a random selection procedure from 
multiple industries or right off the Fortune 500 companies. According to Kesner 
(1987), the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance differed across 
different industries. He found that, for low-growth industries, managerial 
ownership did not seem to influence either current or future performance. 
Alternatively, high-growth industries were found to have a positive and 
significant relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
His study suggests that focusing on one industry or similar industries may 
provide better insights and eliminate a possible industry effect Industry effect, 
caused by using mixed industries as a sample, may distort the overall result 
because of the diverse, or sometimes conflicting, characteristics of different 
industries. This thesis, by focusing on one industry, will provide industry- 
effect-free results.
While some studies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980) 
included accounting ratios as performance measures in their studies on the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, numerous 
researchers (Kim, Lee, and Francis, 1988; Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein, 1986; 
Tsetsekos and DeFusco, 1990) have used stock return as the only performance 
measure. Stock return has been the common performance measure among the 
previous studies examining the relationship between managerial stock holdings
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7and firm performance. The reason for focusing on stock performance may be 
because of the strong dependence of executives' wealth on the stock market 
value. This study, by employing various performance measures from asset 
utilization (total asset turnover), operating efficiency (operating efficiency ratio), 
and profitability (operating return, net profit margin, return on assets, return on 
investment, and return on equity) to stock return, examines the impact of 
managerial ownership on various performance measures of the restaurant firms.
None of the previous studies on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance have focused on the service industry, except 
one thesis by Qian (1996). Qian examined the lodging and casino industry, but 
used only a limited number of observations. In comparison, this study collected 
data from 224 observations covering a two-year period and focused only on the 
restaurant industry. The result will help to find and add  a performance variable 
in the restaurant industry.
The findings of the study will reveal if managerial holdings can be used 
as an incentive for restaurant executives to improve firm performance in terms of 
profitability, operating efficiency, and stock return. Also, the findings will 
disclose whether increasing the extent of managerial ownership is a valid 
strategy for the restaurant industry to use in order to better align managers' 
interest w ith shareholders'.
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Limitations of the Study
The study will have the limitations as noted below:
1. The sam ple is limited to the publicly traded restaurant firms. Privately 
held restaurant firms were excluded due to the inaccessibility of data.
2. Some small public restaurant firms were not included because the data 
required for this study was incomplete or unavailable.
Delimitations
The scope of the study is delimited by:
1. Defining the restaurant firm as a firm whose primary business is food and 
beverage sales, and is classified as an eating place by primary SIC code 5812 
in the Compact Disclosure database. Companies with 5812 as secondary SIC 
code were not included because their primary business is not restaurant 
operation.
2. Using key accounting ratios which have been commonly used by previous 
researchers in the financial literature and stock return as measures of financial 
performance and market performance.
3. Defining managerial ownership as shares held by officers and directors at 
the corporate level. Ownership held by managers at lower levels was not 
included in this study due to lack of information.
4. Using m arket value of equity as a measure of firm size.
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Definition of Terms
1) Agency relationship: a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agen t
2) Agency cost the inefficiencies that result from the conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders in the firms with low managerial 
ownership.
3) Managerial ownership: the outstanding shares held by the firm's corporate 
officers, directors, or individuals actively involved in the corporate 
decisions.
4) Market value of equity: total market value of the outstanding common 
equity. It was used as a measure of firm size.
5) Restaurant industry: a group of firms whose primary business is food & 
beverage sales, and which provide an eating place. All types of publicly 
traded restaurant firms were included as a sample in this study.
6) Accounting performance: a firm's financial ability in profitability and 
efficiency. Seven accounting ratios (i.e. total asset turnover, operating 
efficiency ratio, net profit margin, operating return, return on assets, 
return on equity, and return on investment) were used to evaluate the 
restaurant firm's accounting performance.
7) Total asset turnover (ATT): a measure of firm's efficiency in asset 
utilization. This ratio can be computed by dividing net sales by average
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
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total assets.
8) Net profit margin (NPM): a measure of firm's profitability. Net profit 
margin can be obtained by dividing net income by net sales.
9) Operating efficiency ratio (OE): a measure of firm's operating efficiency. 
This can be obtained by dividing income before fixed charges by total 
revenue.
10) Operating return (OR): a ratio of operating cash flow to total operating 
assets. Operating assets are defined as total assets minus investment & 
advance to subsidiaries. This is a fine measure of profitability that is left 
most to the discretion of managers.
11) Return on assets (ROA): a measure of a firm's profitability. ROA can be 
computed by dividing net income by average total assets.
12) Return on equity (ROE): a measure of return to the common shareholders.
ROE can be obtained by dividing net income by average common equity.
13) Return on investment (ROI): a measure of the return on the invested 
capital. It is obtained by dividing net income by the sum of long-term 
liability and equity.
14) Price-eamings ratio (P/E): a ratio of stock price per share to fully diluted 
earnings per share. This ratio expresses the price that the market places on 
the earning ability of a firm. P /E  ratio was used as a control variable in 
measuring stock performance.
15) Stock return (SR): stock price change in percentage during a certain period. 
It can be calculated as: R = (Pi + D - Po)/Po where.
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I l
R = stock return
Pi = closing price on the ending date 
Po = closing price on the beginning date 
D = dividend during the period.
16) Small firm size effect abnormal risk-adjusted returns that appeared in the 
stock performance of small firms as opposed to large firms.
17) P /E  effect an effect appearing in stock return due to information on price- 
eam ings ratio that indicates the future earning pow er of a firm. P /E  effect 
has been found to be inversely related with future stock performance.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction
In an attem pt to provide adequate background information and enhance 
an understanding of the relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance of the restaurant firms, this chapter covers two major domains; 
theoretical background and empirical studies. Reviewed in the first part of the 
chapter are agency theory, suggestions about agency problems, managerial 
ownership, employee stock ownership plan, and motivation theory. The second 
part discusses empirical studies on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance, and other relevant issues on control variables.
Agency Relationship and Costs 
It may not be overstated that firms exist to pursue maximization of 
returns to owners or shareholders. Most corporations today, however, because 
of the separation of ownership and management, may have difficulty meeting 
the best interest of owners. Because owners or shareholders are not the ones 
who operate or manage the firm, they have to delegate some decision making 
authority to someone whose interest may not be aligned with theirs.
12
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) systematically developed the agency model 
that is em bedded on this owner (principal)-manager (agent) relationship. 
According to them, an agency relationship is created when there is a separation 
of ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling defined agency relationship as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agen t Because of the conflict 
of interests between shareholders and managers, shareholders can not expect 
any matters in conflict with managers to be resolved in their favor. The conflict 
of interests is usually resolved in favor of managers who have the power of 
control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) noted that maximizing sales rather than 
profits is a typical example of managers' interest On the other hand, 
shareholders are more interested in long-term profits than short-term sales 
increase. Because the agents will usually pursue their interests instead of the 
principals' interest, the agency problems and associated costs arise from this 
context
Jensen and Meckling (1976) described agency costs as the various 
inefficiencies that result from the conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders. They defined agency costs as the sum of:
(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal: The principal can limit the 
divergences from his interests by establishing proper incentives for agents 
and incurring monitoring costs.
(2) the bonding expenditures by the agen t The principal will pay the agent to
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expend resources (bonding costs) to make sure that he will not take actions 
which would harm the principal.
(3) the residual loss: There will be some divergences between the agent/s 
decisions and those decisions that would maximize the wealth of the 
principal. The residual loss is the dollar equivalent of the reduction in wealth 
experienced by the principal due to this divergence.
There are several ways of reducing agency problems. One of the simple 
remedies would be to strengthen monitoring and bonding activities. The 
methods may include auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions, and 
incentive compensation system.
Managerial ownership- -as one way of achieving the solution discussed 
above- -can be utilized to increase executives' bonding with the firm and 
increase firm performance. Managers who hold equity in the firm would 
represent the interest of shareholders better because their own wealth is more 
directly affected by the firm's share value. In addition to the wealth-bonding 
factor, executives' enhanced sense of ownership would likely help to reduce the 
inefficiencies or agency costs resulting from the conflicting interests between 
shareholders and managers. Aware of the benefits driven by managerial 
ownership, some companies require executives to buy a certain am ount of stock 
in the firm. A survey by a management consulting firm. Towers Perrin (as cited 
in Reese, 1993), reports that 16% of the observed U.S. companies have adopted or 
are preparing guidelines that specify the amount of stock that executives must 
own. Mandatory stock-buying schemes, however, may not be costless because
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executives, who w ould have to resort to large personal borrowings to meet the 
requirement, m ay require increasing amounts of compensation.
Another way of reducing agency costs would be to use more debt 
financing as Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested. Theoretically, the manager 
can become the sole equity holder by repurchasing all of the outside equity 
claims, thus elim inating the agency problem. He can acquire the equity with 
funds obtained through the issuance of limited liability debt claims and the use 
of his own personal wealth. This method, however, is hypothetical and 
unrealistic as explained below. First, there is a lack of incentives for creditors to 
loan to highly leveraged firms. Potential creditors w ould not loan $100 million 
to a firm in which the entrepreneur has an investment of $10,000 because with 
this financial structure the creditors bear most of the costs, if the company does 
not perform well. Second, there are monitoring costs that are associated with 
debt financing. Bondholders, by including various covenants in the provisions, 
may limit the managerial behavior that results in reductions in the value of the 
bonds. The costs involved in writing provisions, the costs of enforcing them, 
and the reduced profitability due to limiting managem ent's ability to take 
optimal actions on certain issues would likely be non-trivial. Third, there are 
bankruptcy costs when the firm has difficulty meeting its financial obligations 
and is forced into bankruptcy. The probability of bankruptcy will affect not only 
the market price of the firm but also incurs the costs related w ith bankruptcy.
Due to the various costs that are related w ith debt financing, it is rare to find 
firms financed by debt claims solely w ithout a mix of debt and equity.
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Managerial Stock Ownership and 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan
Both managerial stock ownership and employee stock ownership were 
devised as a form of compensation systems with the same purpose of better 
aligning the non-owners' interests w ith the owners'. While managerial 
ownership is for the corporate level executives, employee stock ownership is 
open to employees and lower level managers. An Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan (ESOP) is a compensation and retirement plan that operates through a trust 
mechanism called Employee Stock Ownership Trust (Conte and Kruse, 1991).
The outcomes and benefits of managerial stock ownership and employee stock 
ownership are similar but not homogeneous. Table 1 summarizes an analysis 
and comparison of characteristics and benefits of using managerial ownership 
and ESOP.
The major apparent advantages of providing managerial ownership (MO) 
are improved firm performance and increased returns to shareholders. 
Additionally, managerial ownership can be utilized as a recruiting strategy for 
qualified executives. In 1993, Tom Russo, who turned down a chance for the 
president of Chevys because of a non-satisfactory equity offer, joined Miami 
Subs for the stock options of 2.1 million shares (Bernstein, 1994). This case well 
indicates that equity ownership is a prime factor in the restaurant executives' job 
searches and that equity ownership can be utilized as a motivator.
However, managerial stock ownership is sometimes criticized because of 
the nature of the stock m arket Critics argue that some executives become 
overcompensated despite their poor management. For example, Flagstar
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companies posted a loss of $255 million in revenues in 1992 while the 
compensation of CEO Jerry Richardson rose by more than 200%, to $3.5 million 
because of stock options issued below the prevailing share price (Romeo, 1993). 
Critics point out that one of the reasons that executives of poor performing 
company make a fortune is that a company's shares do not grow in value solely 
because of its own efforts or those of its top executives.
Table 1.
Analysis and Comparison of MO and ESOP
Criteria MO ESOP
Definition & 
Beneficiary
• Compensation for 
corporate level 
executives and top 
management through 
grants or buying 
schemes
• Compensation and 
retirement plan for 
employees and lower 
level managers through a 
trust mechanism
Purpose • To better align the
managers' interests with 
shareholders'
• To better align
employees' interests with 
shareholders'
Benefits
• Improved firm 
performance
• Increased returns to 
shareholders
• Recruiting strategy for 
qualified executives
• Strong bonding with the 
firm
• Tax advantage for the 
firm
• Increased productivity
• Strategy to defend from 
hostile take-over
• Strong bonding with the 
firm
Cost or 
Disadvantage
• Possibility of 
overcompensating 
executives of poor 
performing firms
• Employees' input needs 
to be accomplished to 
reach the maximum 
degree of increased 
productivity
Note: The information was gathered from different sources: Chang, 1990; Conte 
and Kruse, 1991; Demsetz, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Romeo, 1993; Rosen, 
1990; Scholes and Wolfson, 1990; Tsetsekos and DeFusco; 1990
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Meanwhile, the likely advantages of adopting ESOP are (a) increased 
employee productivity, (b) tax benefits, and (c) possible defense from hostile 
take-over attempts. Tax benefits accrue because firms can take advantage of the 
tax deductibility of interest and principal payments resulting from servicing an 
ESOP d eb t A firm paying cash or dividends to the ESOP could also take a tax 
deduction on dividends paid to the ESOP T rust
Another advantage of ESOP is increased productivity as ESOPs are 
required to invest primarily in em ployer securities and the return on an ESOP 
portfolio is likely to be highly related to company performance. However,
Rosen (1990) asserts that there is no automatic linkage between employee 
attitudes and corporate performance and that the performance difference came 
from employees' participation in job-level decision making. He found out that, 
overall, the ESOP firms grew 3-4% faster per year than they would have without 
an ESOP. Most of the difference, however, came from the most participative 
one-third of the companies. These companies allowed for relatively high 
degrees of employee input into job-level decision making and demonstrated 8- 
11% faster growth per year after they set up an ESOP than they would have 
without one. This result may suggest that participation, not ownership, makes 
the difference. However, Rosen (1990) found that executives at participative 
companies consistently felt that participation alone would not be sufficient 
Ownership motivates employees, and participation gives them an opportunity to 
contribute their ideas, knowledge, and experiences to the growth of the 
company.
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Another popular reason for adopting ESOPs is that they can be used 
effectively to thw art hostile takeover attempts. Polaroid's case in 1989 shows 
how the ESOP helped the company defeat the bidder. The employees voted 
their company shares w ith management when the company was faced with a 
hostile tender offer by Shamrock Holdings (Bruner, and Brownlee H, 1990).
Managerial Ownership as a Motivator 
in the Restaurant Industry
This section presents further discussion on managerial ownership in
association with and application of motivation theory. Many restaurant firms
are turning their interest into equity ownership not only to reward, but also to
motivate their executives to improve firm performance and increase the return to
shareholders. However, motivation leading to better performance is not as
easily done as said. Green (1992) notes the difficulty of motivating employees as
follows:
Fundamental to all the popular theories of motivation is the notion that 
employees are motivated to perform better when offered something that 
they w an t Yet m any employees are not so motivated when faced with 
such opportunities. How often have you seen employees offered 
something they wanted, only to discover they were not motivated to work 
harder and perform better? (p.4)
Green (1992) explains that difficulty of associating motivation with performance 
is incurred by failing to link the three stages that Vroom (1964) addressed. 
According to the expectancy theory of motivation popularized by Vroom (1964),
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motivation and performance strategies should address three beliefs. That theory 
is reconceptualized below for clarity.
B1 B2 B3
Effort => Performance => Outcomes => Satisfaction
According to Vroom, the complete connection of B1 stage (belief that effort will 
lead to performance), B2 stage (belief that performance will lead to outcomes), 
and B3 stage (belief that outcomes will lead to satisfaction) will lead to successful 
motivation.
To reflect and emphasize the role of equity ownership as a motivator 
leading to consequential benefits and outcomes, Vroom's conceptualization was 
modified as shown below. Considered that equity ownership is usually offered 
as a reward for the executives' performance, the B2 stage in Vroom's 
conceptualization was brought in as a starting connector in this circular pattern.
SI 52 S3
Performance => Outcomes Satisfaction => Efforts
i : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I
S4
Note: AuthoKs flow chart is based on the Vroom's conceptualization
This modified conceptualization of motivation serves to better explain the 
role of equity ownership in a continuous and on-going process. In this context of 
the model, equity ownership appears to be an efficient motivational tool for 
executives. First, the direct linkage between the firm's stock value and 
executives' wealth (51) is more likely to motivate executives to improve stock 
performance. The SI stage (belief that performance will lead to outcome) is
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clearly manifested to the executives. Second, "a sense of ownership" derived 
from holding the firm's equity seems to work through all motivational stages. 
The enhanced executives' bonding and attachment to the firm will drive them to 
make more efforts (S3). Their efforts w ith a sense of ownership will affect a 
spectrum of activities ranging from daily operating and decision-making to 
pursuing the long-term goal better aligned with shareholders'. This will lead to 
increased efficiency of operation and improved overall firm performance (S4) 
and ,as a result, generating increased wealth for the executives (SI). The S2 stage 
is important in completing and continuing motivational effect A sense of 
ownership will play a big role at this stage when the executives are not satisfied 
with their outcomes. It will help to neutralize and replace their dissatisfaction 
with a sense of ownership and move to the next stage.
The longitudinal motivation effect of managerial ownership is 
advantageous compared to other forms of financial compensation such as 
bonuses and salary raises. While cash bonuses and salary raises may motivate 
executives at the time of receipt, the motivational effect of equity ownership lasts 
longer because their wealth depends on the firm's stock value that reflects 
overall firm performance.
Empirical Studies
Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance 
Many researchers (Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd, 1992; Kim, Lee, and 
Francis, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980)
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viewed managerial holdings as a proxy for the degree of convergence of 
interests between managers and shareholders. They believed that managers 
w ith a large equity position in the firm would more likely improve firm 
performance and maximize firm value as their own wealth depended on 
increases in security prices. However, previous studies (Demsetz and Lehn,
1985; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Hudson, et al., 1992; Lloyd, Jahera, and 
Goldstein, 1986; Morck, et al., 1988; Tsetsekos and DeFusco, 1990) investigating 
the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance have not 
yielded conclusive results.
Managerial Ownership and Accounting Performance
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) tested the hypothesis using accounting ratios as 
performance measures. Their results were not supportive of the 
Jensen/M eckling model. Kesner (1987), who examined the impact of board 
ownership on firm performance, found the financial dependence perspective 
supported in part by his research findings. He identified the type of board 
ownership (inside vs. outside) and examined its impact on various performance 
measures including PM, ROA, ROE, RDI, SR, and EPS (earnings per share). He 
found that only two of the performance measures - PM and ROA - were 
significantly related to the percentage of insiders on the board at the .05 level.
The study by Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) focused on the effects of 
ownership and performance on the executive tenure in 84 U.S. corporations.
They employed profit margin as a measure of operating performance and stock 
return as a measure of performance in the capital m arket The empirical study
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shows that performance measures are related to the tenure of the chief 
executives depending on the concentration of their stock ownership.
Managerial Ownership and Stock Performance
Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein (1986) and Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990) 
found no relationship between managerial ownership and stock performance, 
even after controlling for small firm effect Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990) 
concluded that managerial ownership did not have an effect on portfolio returns 
and that the size effect was independent of ownership.
On the other hand, Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988) discovered a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and stock return while controlling 
size effect and E /P  effect (or P /E  effect). The reason for controlling the size 
effect and E /P  effect in the measurement of stock performance is that they are 
possible causes of abnormal returns that appear in certain groups of securities. 
The conclusions of Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988) support the hypothesis that 
managerial ownership has an impact on market performance. In other words, 
firms with high managerial ownership outperform those with low managerial 
ownership in stock return. A further study by Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd (1992) 
provides additional empirical evidence that ownership is a significant factor in 
explaining firm performance even after controlling for other market anomalies.
Managerial Ownership and Market Valuation of firms
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) examined the relationship between 
managerial ownership and market valuation of large firms. They found that
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there was a significant nonmonotonic relationship between the managerial stock 
holdings and market valuation of the firm, as measured by Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q 
was computed by dividing a firm's market value by the replacement cost of its 
physical assets. Their study found a positive relation between managerial 
ownership and Tobin's Q in the 0% to 5% board ownership range, a negative 
and less pronounced relation in the 5% to 25% range, and a positive relation 
again in the range beyond 25%. As they explained, the initial rise in Q may 
reflect managers' greater incentives to maximize value as their stakes rise. In the 
5% to 25% ownership range, the negative and less significant correlation may be 
related with conditions conducive to the entrenchment of incumbent 
management such as a founder, increased voting power, increased tenure with 
and attachment to the firm, and lower employment of professional managers. 
Throughout this range, the incentive effect of managerial ownership could still 
be operative; it might just be dominated by the entrenchment effect Beyond 
25% of managerial ownership, the positive correlation may reflect a pure 
convergence-of-interest effect after the entrenchment stage.
Impact of Managerial Ownership among Different Industries
Kesner's (1987) study focused on the stock ownership of the board of 
directors for 250 of the Fortune 500 companies. He suspected that the 
relationship between stock ownership and firm performance differs among 
different industries. He used industry growth rate based on changes in profits 
during the observed year to classify the 27 industries as either low-growth or 
high-growth industry. His study showed that the association between
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managerial ownership and performance differed among different industries.
The empirical results indicate that stock ownership does not appear to influence 
either current or future performance in low-growth industries. Alternatively, 
high-growth industries do reveal a positive and significant relationship between 
managerial ownership and performance. Kesneris study suggests that using 
multiple industries as a sample, when investigating the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance, may distort the overall resu lt His 
study further implies that focusing on one industry or similar industries can 
help control for the industry effect
Executive Compensation and Firm Size 
Previous studies (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin, 1992; Magnan, S t Onge, and Thome, 1995) have found a strong positive 
association between firm size and executive compensation. Child (1973) 
explained the association with internal organization of a firm  and external labor 
market. The association between executive compensation and internal 
organization is based on the finding that large firms tend to have more 
hierarchical levels of compensation than small firms. External labor market 
implies that executives who manage larger and more complex firms usually 
show more knowledge and ability than do executives of smaller and less 
complex firms. Accordingly, the executive compensation of large firms is more 
extensive than that of small firms. Many previous studies investigating the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance controlled 
firm size because of the implicit association between firm size and compensation
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(see Geddes, 1997; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Magnan, et al., 1995).
Small Firm Effect and Stock Return 
Small firm effect refers to the prevailing effect appeared in the small firms 
that experience abnormally high risk-adjusted stock returns opposed to large 
firms. The documentation on the superior market performance of small firms 
can be found in the empirical studies of Banz (1981) and Peterson (1974). Banz 
(1981) revealed that stocks w ith lower market values outperformed stocks with 
larger market values by a significant margin. Similarly, Peterson (1974) showed 
that stocks w ith lower total book values of assets provided higher risk-adjusted 
rates of return than stocks with higher total invested capital. Numerous 
empirical studies have documented the small firm effect But the reason or 
reasons for the effect remain unclear. Some possible explanations such as beta 
biases, tax effects, transaction costs, trading activity, and return measurement 
techniques have been investigated extensively.
Roll (1981) suggested that trading activity affected returns because less 
frequent trading activity by small firms caused estimates of systematic risk to be 
biased dow nw ard and excess returns were overstated. On the contrary, James 
and Edmister (1983) contended that a liquidity premium for infrequent trading 
in smaller firms added little to the explanation.
Several studies (Keim, 1983; Reinganum, 1983; Roll, 1983) showed that the 
small firm size effect was most evident in the month of January, and this might 
be related to tax loss selling in the smaller firms. However, James and Edmister 
(1983) found that the small firm effect existed nevertheless, even after controlling
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for trading frequency.
Stoll and Whaley (1983) discovered that transaction costs for small firms 
were higher, partially because of wider dealer spreads, and the higher 
transaction costs were related with higher stock returns. Schultz (1983) asserted 
that return differences between large and small firms could not be explained 
solely by differences in transaction costs.
Recently, extensive studies have been conducted on the principal-agent 
relationship as a potential factor to explain the so-called stock return anomalies. 
The hypothesis of the agency theory is that the abnormal returns appearing in 
small firms, where relatively high managerial ownership is found, may be 
related to managerial stock holdings. Because of the relationship between firm 
size and stock performance, several studies (Cook and Rozeff, 1984; Lloyd,
Jahera, and Goldstein, 1986; Tsetsekos and DeFusco, 1990) investigating the 
impact of managerial ownership on stock performance controlled small firm size 
effect by forming portfolios by the intersection of size and ownership. On the 
other hand, the study by Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988) included firm size with 
other variables in the m ultiple regression.
P /E  effect and Stock Performance 
Investors view price-eamings (P/E) ratio as a good gauge of future 
earning pow er of the firm (Gibson, 1995). Basu (1977) observed that firms whose 
common stock traded at low price-eamings ratios tend to outperform firms with 
high price-eamings ratios. Banz (1981) further supported the argum ent that 
price-eamings ratio has an impact on stock performance. Kim, Lee, and Francis
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(1988) also found that security returns were significantly associated with 
earnings yield. Earnings yield (E/P) ratio is reverse to P /E  ratio. They showed 
that firms whose common stock traded at high earnings yield outperform those 
with low earnings yield. On the other hand, Reinganum (1981) asserted that 
E /P  effect was present in rates of return only when considered separately from 
small firm size effect He found that when small firm size effect and E /P  effect 
were considered together, one effect subsumed the other. However, the study 
by Cook and Rozeff (1984) demonstrated that equity returns are related to both 
firm size and E /P  ratio. Cook and Rozeff (1984) argued that Reinganum's 
finding (1981) that size subsumed E /P  ratio was caused by a fortuitous choice of 
methods.
Many previous studies (Banz, 1981; Basu, 1977; Kim, Lee, and Francis, 
1988) based on price-earnings ratio hypothesis support that P /E  ratios, due to 
exaggerated investor expectations, may be indicators of future investment 
performance. Basu (1977) argued that price-eamings ratio could be viewed as a 
proxy variable for the firm's expected rate of retum . He concluded in his study 
(1977) that
Contrary to the growing belief that publicly available information is 
instantaneously impounded in security prices, there seem to be lags and 
frictions in the adjustment process. As a result, publicly available P /E  
ratios seem to possess "information content" and may w arrant an 
investor's attention at the time of portfolio formation or revision. (p.681) 
Because of the relationship between P /E  ratio and stock performance.
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previous studies investigating the relationship between managerial ownership 
and stock performance included P /E  ratio as a control variable. Some studies 
(Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd, 1992; Cook and Rozeff, 1984), to control P /E  effect, 
used a cross-classification method by forming portfolios by the intersection of 
managerial ownership and P /E  ratio. Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988) used a 
som ewhat different procedure from these studies. They included E /P  (or P/E) 
ratio in the m ultiple regression with other variables.
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Introduction
Following the procedures and methods used in the previous studies 
(Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd, 1992; Kim, Lee, and Francis, 1988) on the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, this study 
uses a multiple regression analysis with firm size and P /E  ratio included as 
control variables. The Chapter EQ is organized in the following order:
1. Data Collection and the Sample
2. Variables
3. Hypotheses Testing
4. Preliminary Test
Data Collection and the Sample
The financial data of the restaurant firms classified by primary SIC code 
5812 (eating place) were draw n mostly from the Cotnpact Disclosure CD-ROM 
database. The sample includes two-year observations (1995-1996). The sample 
selection followed the procedures employed by previous studies that used 
multiple-year observations (see Kim, Lee, and Francis, 1988; Lloyd, Jahera, and
30
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Goldstein, 1986; Miller, 1995), The Compact Disclosure contained financial data of 
190 restaurant firms for 1995 and 181 for 1996 respectively. Due to unavailability 
of managerial ownership information, a total of 147 observations were omitted 
from the sample, leaving 111 observations for 1995 and 113 for 1996 available for 
the final sample of 224 observations. Due to potential bias that may arise from 
using selective firms' successive two-year data, additional data set was created 
to include only one-year data from the 146 restaurant firms.
Information on the managerial ownership percentage and size, measured 
by market value of a firm's equity, were collected from the same database.
Equity market value was derived by multiplying the total number of 
outstanding shares by market price. Stock prices were collected from Historical 
Stock Quotes in America On Line. Stock retum  was calculated as the percentage 
change in the price during a year. Price-eamings ratio was calculated by 
dividing the stock price of the ending date (December 31) by earnings per share 
for the past 12 months. Information on the earnings per share was obtained 
from Internet WWW. Dailvstocks. N e t Accounting ratios of asset tumover, net 
profit margin, retum  on assets, retum  on equity, and retum  on investment were 
gathered from the Compact Disclosure database. Operating efficiency ratio and 
operating retum  were calculated based on the financial statements in the 
Compact Disclosure. Table 2 provides a list of restaurant firms included in this 
study. Because not all firms were available for two-year observations, some 
restaurant firms were used for only one-year observation. A total of 146 
restaurant firms were selected for a final sample of 224 observations.
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Table 2.
The Sample Firms
Com pany
1. Ail American Food Group Inc.
2. Apple South Inc.
3. Applebee's International Inc.
4. Au Bon Pain Co. Inc.
5. Austin's Steaks & Salon Inc.
6. Back Bay Restaurant Group Inc.
7. Back Yard Burgers Inc.
8. Bayport Restaurant Group Inc.
9. Bertuccis Inc.
10. Bob Evans Farms Inc.
11. Boston Chicken Inc.
12. Brazil Fast Food Corp.
13. Brinker International Inc.
14. Buffets Inc.
15. Casa Ole Restaurants Inc.
16. Central Coal & Coke Corp.
17. Champions Sports Inc.
18. Chart House Enterprises Inc.
19. Checker Drive In Restaurants Inc.
20. Cheesecake Factory Inc.
21. Chefs International Inc.
22. Chicago Pizza & Brewery Inc.
23. Ciao Limited.
24. Ciatti's Inc.
25. CKE Restaurants Inc.
26. Cluckcorp International Inc.
27. Consolidated Products Inc.
28. Cooker Restaurant Corp.
29. Country Star Restaurants Inc.
30. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc.
31. Creative Host Services Inc.
32. Daka International Inc.
33. Darden Restaurants Inc.
34. Dave & Busters Inc.
35. DenAmerica Corp.
36. Eateries Inc.
37. Einstein Noah Bagel Corp.
38. El Chico Restaurants Inc.
39. Elephant & Castle Group Inc.
40. Elmers Restaurants Inc.
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41. ELXSI Corp.
42. Family Steak House of Florida Inc.
43. Fine Host Corp.
44. Flagstar Cos. Inc.
45. Foodmaker Inc.
46. Foodquest Inc.
47. Fresh Choice Inc.
48. Frisch's Restaurants Inc.
49. Furr's Bishops Inc.
50. Garden Fresh Restaurant Corp.
51. GB Foods Corp.
52. Good Times Restaurants Inc.
53. Grand Havana Enterprises Inc.
54. Grill Concepts Inc.
55. Ground Round Restaurants Inc.
56. Hometown Buffet Inc.
57. Host M arriott Services Corp.
58. Houlihans Restaurant Group Inc.
59. IHOP Corp.
60. Integrated Brands Inc.
61. International Dairy Queen Inc.
62. International Fast Food Corp.
63. International Franchise Systems Inc.
64. Italian Oven Inc.
65. J. Alexander's Corp.
66. Jake's Pizza International Inc.
67. Java Centrale Inc.
68. Jerry's Famous Deli Inc.
69. Koo Koo Roo Inc.
70. Krystal Co.
71. Landry's Seafood Restaurants Inc.
72. Linda's Diversified Holdings Inc.
73. Logan's Roadhouse Inc.
74. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon Inc.
75. Longhorn Steaks Inc.
76. Luby's Cafeterias Inc.
77. Macheezmo Mouse Restaurants Inc.
78. Magnolia Foods Inc.
79. Main St & Main Inc.
80. Manhattan Bagel Co. Inc.
81. Maverick Restaurants Inc.
82. Max & Erma's Restaurants Inc.
83. M cDonald's Corp.
84. Michigan Brewery Inc.
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85. Morgan's Foods Inc.
86. Morrison Fresh Cooking Inc.
87. Morrison Health Care Inc.
88. Morton's Restaurant Group Inc.
89. Nashville Country Club Inc.
90. New York Bagel Enterprises Inc.
91. Newriders Inc.
92. Noble Roman's Inc.
93. NFC International Inc.
94. Nutrition Management Services Co.
95. O Charley's Inc.
96. Outback Steakhouse Inc.
97. Papa John's International Inc.
98. Pepsi Co. Inc.
99. Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc.
100. Pizza Inn Inc.
101. PJ America Inc.
102. Planet Hollywood International Inc.
103. Polio Tropical Inc.
104. Pudgie's Chicken Inc.
105. QPQ Corp.
106. Quality Dining Inc.
107. Quantum Restaurants Inc.
108. Rainforest Café Inc.
109. Rally's Hamburgers Inc.
110. Rare Hospitality International Inc.
111. Rattlesnake Holding Co. Inc.
112. Red Hot Concepts Inc.
113. Roadhouse Grill Inc.
114. Rock Bottom Restaurants Inc.
115. Royal Canadian Foods Corp.
116. Ruby Tuesday Inc.
117. Ryan's Family Steak Houses Inc.
118. Sagebrush Inc.
119. Sbarro Inc.
120. Scholotzsky's Inc.
121. Shells Seafood Restaurants Inc.
122. Shoney's Inc.
123. Showbiz Pizza Time Inc.
124. Silver Diner Inc.
125. Sixx Holdings Inc.
126. Sizzler International Inc.
127. Skyline Chili Inc.
128. Sonic Corp.
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129. Spaghetti Warehouse Inc.
130. Stacey's Buffet Inc.
131. Summit Family Restaurants Inc.
132. Taco Cabana Inc.
133. Terrace Holdings Inc.
134. Timber Lodge Steakhouse Inc.
135. TPI Enterprises Inc.
136. Tubby's Inc.
137. Unique Casual Restaurants Inc.
138. United Restaurants Inc.
139. Universal Franchise Opportunities Corp.
140. Value Holdings Inc.
141. Vicorp Restaurants Inc.
142. Vie De France Corp.
143. Volunteer Capital Corp.
144. Wall Street Deli Inc.
145. Watermarc Food Management Co.
146. W endy's International Inc.
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Variables
Managerial ownership percentage (MOP) was used as an independent 
variable. MOP was defined as the percentage of outstanding shares held by a 
firm's corporate officers, directors, or individuals actively involved in the 
corporate decisions. Eight perform ance ratios were selected as dependent 
variables to measure various firm performance. In consideration of Hofer's 
(1983) notion that it is common to see several different indices used because 
organizations legitimately seek to accomplish a variety of different objectives, 
ranging from profitability to effective asset utilization and high stockholder 
returns, the study adopted a host of performance measures to evaluate both 
accounting ratios and stock retum . While return on assets (ROA), retum  on 
equity (ROE), retum  on investm ent (ROI), operating retum  (OR), operating 
efficiency ratio (OE), net profit m argin (NPM), and total asset turnover (ATT) 
were adopted to measure accounting performance, stock return (SR) was used to 
measure market performance.
ROA, a ratio of net income to total assets, measures the retum  to the total 
financing provided by shareholders, and long-term and short-term creditors. 
ROE, defined as net income div ided  by common equity, is an indicator of the 
retum  to the owners or the shareholders. ROI, a ratio of net income to the 
invested capital, measures the re tum  to capital or long-term and perm anent 
financing. NPM is computed by dividing net income by net revenue. OE, 
income before fixed charges d iv ided  by total revenue, is a fine m easure of 
management's performance because this ratio considers only those expenses that
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management can generally control. OR is a ratio of operating cash flow to the 
operating assets, excluding the effect of depreciation and interest expenses.
Thus, this ratio represents a better measurement of managerial performance 
because operating activity is left most at discretion of managers. ATT, a ratio of 
net sales divided by average total assets, measures the ability to generate sales 
through the use of assets. SR was defined as the percentage change in stock 
price during a year.
Firm size was used as a control variable. M arket value of outstanding 
common equity was used as a measure of firm size, following some previous 
studies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd, 1992; Kim, Lee, 
and Francis, 1988; Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein, 1986; Tsetsekos and DeFusco, 
1990). While some other studies (Geddes, 1997; Magnon, St. Onge, and Thome, 
1995; Miller, 1995) used sales of a firm as a measure of firm size, Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) included a firm's book value of assets as a firm size variable. 
Exploring the impact of managerial holdings on performance needs to consider 
the impact of firm size. First, firm size has been found to have an impact on 
stock retum s (Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981) and previous studies investigating 
the relationship between managerial ownership and stock performance used size 
as a control variable (Hudson et al., 1992; Kim et al., 1988; Lloyd, et al., 1986; 
Tsetsekos and DeFusco, 1990). Second, it is indispensable to investigate the role 
of firm size because of the implicit association between firm size and incentives 
offered to executives. Many studies (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Gomez- 
Mejia and Balkin, 1992 ; Magnan, et al., 1995) documented a strong positive
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  cop yrigh t ow ner. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
38
association between firm size and executive compensation. It is apparent that 
the incentives offered to executives of large firms are greater than those of small 
firms, with the level of managerial ownership concentration being held constant, 
because it is easier for executives of small firms to obtain a large percentage of 
holdings.
Because actual market value of equity could not serve as a size measure 
due to the immense gap in firm size among the sample firms, firm size or market 
value of equity was log-transformed. For example, company A, the size of 
which is 100 times larger than company B, would not have 100 times greater 
incentives for managers to achieve 100 times better financial performance than 
company B. According to the theory of data transformation (Norusis, 1996), the 
logarithmic transformation has the effect of stretching extremely small values 
and condensing extremely large values of variables, thus, making the 
relationship more linear.
Price-eamings ratio, defined as the market price of a share of common 
stock divided by the earnings per share, was employed as an additional control 
variable in examining the impact of managerial ownership on stock 
performance. Previous studies (Banz, 1981; Basu, 1977; Kim, Lee, and Francis, 
1988) found a significantly negative impact of P /E  ratio on stock performance.
Hypotheses Testing
A m ultiple regression analysis was used to examine the impact of 
managerial ownership on various performance measures. Like most other 
studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm
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performance, this study included firm size and P /E  ratio as control variables. 
The following multiple regression formula was created based on the previous 
discussion of the variables.
Y  = Ao + AiXi  + A 2X 2 + A3X3 
where:
Y = financial performance variable measured by different 
accounting ratios and stock retum  
Xi = percentage of managerial ownership 
Xi= firm size measured by market value of equity 
X3 = P /E  ratio, when Y is stock retum  
Ai  = constant or coefficients of independent variables 
(/ = 0,1, 2, and 3)
If Ai, A2, and A3 are 0, the null hypotheses can not be rejected. This means that 
independent variables do not have any significant impact on the dependent 
variable.
The following null hypotheses were tested to examine if managerial 
ownership, firm size, and P /E  ratio (when Y is stock retum) have significant 
impact on each performance variable.
Null Hypotheses:
(a) There is no significant impact of managerial ownership and firm size on 
asset tum over (Ai=0; Az=0).
(b) There is no significant impact of managerial ownership and firm size on 
operating efficiency (Ai=0; Az=0).
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(c) There is no significant impact of managerial ownership and firm size on 
net profit margin (Ai=0; Az=0).
(d) There is no significant impact of managerial ownership and firm size on 
operating return (Ai=0; A2=0).
(e) There is no significant impact of managerial ownership and firm size on 
return on assets (Ai=0; Az=0).
(f) There is no significant impact of managerial ownership and firm size on 
return on equity (Ai=0; Az=0).
(g) There is no significant impact of managerial ownership and firm size on 
return on investment (Ai=0; Az=0).
(h) There is no significant impact of managerial ownership, firm size, and 
price-eamings ratio on stock return (Ai=0; A2=0; A3=0).
To examine whether the degree of association between independent 
variables and a dependent variable differs across the firms with different levels 
of m anagerial ownership, the following procedures were completed. The 224 
observations were ranked according to the managerial ownership percentage to 
form three evenly divided groups. The first group contained 75 observations in 
the lowest managerial ownership range, from 0% to 15%. The second group had 
75 observations in the medium managerial ownership range, from 15% to 33%. 
The third group consisted of 74 observations with managerial ownership 
ranging from 33% to 82%. The same null hypotheses and multiple regression 
model as those used for the entire group were formulated for hypothesis testing 
of each group.
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Because of the multiple independent variables employed in the 
regression, a multicoUinearity diagnosis test was conducted to measure the 
tolerance level. The tolerance, the strength of the linear relationships among the 
independent variables, is to identify the proportion of variability of the variable 
that is not explained by its linear relationship with the other independent 
variables in the model (Norusis, 1996). A value close to 1 indicates that an 
independent variable has little of its variability explained by the other 
independent variables. A value close to 0 suggests multicoUinearity. For the 
correlation test between firm size and managerial ownership concentration, a 
bivariate correlation test was conducted. The t-test for equality of means used 
for the preliminary test served to confirm the necessity of including firm size as 
a control variable.
Because of the potential bias that may result from using selective firms' 
successive two-year data, another multiple regression was performed to cross­
check the validity of data used for the study. For this test, only one-year data 
were included from the 146 restaurant firms. To maintain consistency, 1996 data 
were selected if the firm had two-year information.
Preliminary Test
The preliminary test was designed to examine the effect of firm size on 
performance while holding managerial ownership constant. The test result 
confirmed the necessity of including firm size as a control variable in examining 
the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.
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The Effect of Firm Size on Firm Performance
after Holding MOP Constant 
To hold the managerial ownership percentage (MOP) constant, all 
samples were cross-classified by both managerial ownership level and firm size. 
First, all firms were divided into three groups according to their managerial 
ownership level. Second, each group consisting of firms w ith fairly homogenous 
managerial ownership was subclassified into two subgroups arrayed from the 
smallest firms to largest firms. The t-test for equality of means was conducted to 
examine whether the average performance differs across firm size within each 
group of similar managerial ownership concentration.
Table 3.
The Size Effect After Holding MOP Constant
(
Low
jto u p l  
MOP Firms Met
Group2 
MOP Firms
Groupe 
H igh MOP 'irms
Size S L Si;?. S L % • S L Sig.
ATT 1.74 1.30 ■irk 1.25 1.25 1.70 1.55
OE -0.06 0.13 **** -0.38 0.13 -irirk-k -0.09 0.07 ■irk
NPM -0.20 0.05 AA'AA -0.57 0.04 •irirk -0.17 -0.01 •k*
OR 0.05 0.17 ■irk* -0.10 0.14 *~k~k-k 0.05 0.15 ■irk
ROA -0.34 0.06 * -0.29 0.03 ■k’kk-A -0.16 0.02 ■iHHrk
ROE -0.50 0.16 A*** -0.64 -0.02 ■irk -0.33 0.08 k-irk
ROI -0.23 0.08 ■irk -0.80 -0.01 ■k* -0.22 0.03 ■kk
SR 0.07 0.41 -0.30 0.23 krirArk -0.26 0.03 k k
Note. The values represent mean percentages of performance. The t-test for 
equality of means was used. Group 1 consists of firms with 0% - 15% MOP. 
Group 2 consists of firms with 15% - 33% MOP. Group 3 consists of firms with 
33% - 82% MOP. S stands for small size firms. L stands for large size firms. 
*p<.l. **p<.05. ***p<.01. ****p<.005.
Table 3 presents mean values of performance and the significance level 
for the equality of means. The result reveals that the average performance of 
large firms, by most of the performance measures, is superior to that of small
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firms a t the significance level of 0.1 or better when managerial ownership was 
held constant In other words, large firms outperform small firms when they 
have similar managerial ownership concentration. Therefore, it is suggested that 
controlling firm size is necessary in exploring the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance.
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RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Introduction
This chapter discusses performance of the sample restaurant firms and 
empirical findings regarding the relationship among managerial ownership, 
firm size, and various performance measures. The group-wise analysis is also 
presented. This analysis enables us to examine whether the degree of 
association among managerial ownership, firm size, and firm performance is 
different across the firms with different levels of managerial ownership.
Overview of Financial Performance
Table 4 summarizes eight performance ratios, firm size, and managerial 
ownership percentage of the sample restaurant firms evaluated between 1995 
and 1996. The figures in the table are based on the descriptive statistics of 224 
observations. The sample shows an average 27% of managerial ownership while 
the range varies from zero, which means negligible managerial holdings, to 82%. 
The firm size ranges are widely spread from the smallest, $0.11 million to the 
largest, $57.2 billion. The latter is 520,000 times as large as the former. While the 
mean size is $987 million, the m edian is only $45 million. This implies that the
44
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Table 4.
Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Restaurant Firms
Variable Mean SD M edian M inim um M aximum
ATT 1.47 0.78 1.37 0.08 6.04
OE -0.03 0.46 0.07 -5.22 0.42
NPM -0.14 0.63 0.01 -7.62 0.63
OR 0.08 0.21 0.12 -1.01 0.90
ROA -0.11 0.58 0.02 -7.13 1.68
ROE -0.12 1.65 0.04 -7.03 17.03
ROI -0.14 1.06 0.03 -9.84 7.33
SR 0.06 0.72 -0.03 -0.92 4.90
Size ($ million) 986.56 6,071.80 45.48 0.11 57,200.00
MOP 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.82
Note. The statistics are based on the 1995-1996 data from Compact Disclosure CD 
ROM. SD means standard deviations. MOP refers to managerial ownership 
percentage.
The relatively high values of the standard deviation in the restaurant 
firms' performance indicate large performance variability among the restaurant 
firms. Qian (1996) showed that the standard deviation for the hotel/casino 
industry ranged from 0.04 to 0.32 w hen the performance was measured by OR, 
NPM, ROA, ROE, ROI, and stock return. The restaurant industry shows a much 
wider range of variability from 0.21 to 1.65 when the same variables were 
compared. This suggests that overall performance of the restaurant industry is 
not well balanced among the well-performing and poor-performing restaurant 
firms. However, considered that restaurant firms are more diversified in the 
type of operations ranging from quick-service (McDonald's), limited service, and 
upscale restaurants (Morton's) to food-contractors (Fine Host), the greater 
performance variability shown in the restaurant industry, compared to
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hotel/casino industry, seems natural.
The higher mean values of all profitability variables, compared to their 
counterpart medians, suggest that the majority of the restaurant firms tend to 
perform below standards.
Test Results
MOP, Firm size, and Performance 
The evidence as to whether managerial ownership affects performance in 
the presence of a possible size effect was obtained by conducting a multiple 
regression. Table 5 presents the regression results on the relationship among 
managerial ownership, firm size, P /E  ratio (when performance is stock return), 
and firm performance. Presented in the table are model F test significance level, 
model R square, coefficients of independent variables, the t-test significance 
level associated with each independent variable, and tolerance level. A 
significance level less than 0.1 is usually considered to be a valid value to reject 
the null hypothesis and indicates a significant association among the variables. 
Tolerance level is a test statistic for multicoUinearity diagnosis. MulticoUinearity 
refers to the linear relationship between independent variables, which makes a 
m ultiple regression model unreliable. A tolerance level less than 0.1 indicates 
strong multicoUinearity. In the table, the tolerance values are all around 0.9, 
suggesting that multicoUinearity is not a problem in the regression.
Managerial ownership variable (MOP) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level in its correlation with OE, NPM, OR, ROA, and ROE,
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and a t the 0.1 level w ith ROI. These data indicate that restaurant firms with 
higher managerial holdings experience higher accounting performance. This 
result is supportive of the agency model and motivation theory that suggest that 
managerial ownership will motivate executives to increase firm performance.
Table 5.
Results of M ultiple Regression
Measures Model 
R Square 
& Sig. F
MOP 
Coefficients 
& Sig. T
Size 
Coefficients 
& Sig. T
P /E
Coefficient
& Sig.T
TL
ATT 0.023* 0.313 -0.089 0.918
OE 0.175*** 0.305** 0.214*** 0.918
NPM 0.263*** 0.360** 0.218*** 0.916
OR 0.242*** 0.187** 0.111*** 0.919
ROA 0.153*** 0.491** 0.246*** 0.918
ROE 0.112*** 0.742** 0.405*** 0.905
ROI 0.106*** 0.583* 0.340*** 0.912
SR 0.581*** -0.020 0.731*** 0.088 0.883
Note. Simultaneous m ultiple regression was conducted. TL stands for tolerance 
level.
* p < .l . **p<.05. ***p<.001.
In reviewing the results in Table 5, it is noteworthy that at the 0.001 
significance level firm size is positively correlated w ith all the performance 
measures except asset turnover. This suggests that large restaurant firms 
outperform small ones in terms of profitability, operating efficiency, and stock 
return. This is probably due to their economy of scale, competitive advantages 
such as easier access to management know-how and technologies, and more 
attractive incentive packages offered to executives. The regression results show 
that the restaurant firms' performance is positively associated with both firm 
size and the degree of managerial holdings in all the performance measures
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except stock return and asset turnover.
On the other hand, neither of the two independent variables has any 
significant impact on asset turnover (ATT). Asset turnover is a ratio of net sales 
to average total assets. The enormous total assets of a large restaurant firm 
makes it hard to have a high turnover ratio. Unlike other accounting ratios that 
measure profits from different perspectives, asset turnover measures sales 
activities. The fact that managerial ownership has a positive impact on all the 
profitability ratios but lacks a significant impact on asset turnover suggests that 
restaurant executives with large equity holdings may be more profit-oriented, 
rather than sales-oriented.
Stock return shows a significant correlation with size but no significant 
association w ith managerial ownership. An interesting finding is that the small 
firm size effect that appeared in the previous studies is not present in this 
sample. According to many previous studies, small firms experience higher 
rates of return. However, our sample does not show any small firm size effect in 
market performance. Rather, the result shows a positive relation between firm 
size and stock return at the significance level of 0.001. This result, contradictory 
from the previous studies, may be related to industry-specific factors (i.e. 
different characteristics) and relatively short-term observation.
In order to test validity of the data collection method used in this study, 
another data set containing only one-year observations was created. The result 
of the multiple regression using new data set was same as the result above, 
indicating validity of the data.
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MOP, Firm Size, and Performance 
within Ownership Ranked Classes
To see w hether the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance 
is more significant in one group than the others, the 224 observations were 
ranked according to the managerial ownership percentage and then evenly 
divided into three groups. The first group contained 75 observations in the 
lowest managerial ownership range, from 0% to 15%, with an average of 7% 
managerial holdings and an average firm size of $2,618 million. The second 
group had 75 observations of medium managerial ownership, ranging between 
15% and 33%, with a mean of 24% and an average firm size of $251 million. The 
third group consisted of 74 observations with the highest managerial ownership 
percentage ranging from 33% to 82% with a mean of 51% managerial ownership 
and a mean size of $81 million.
The grouping of the sample confirms Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) finding 
of an inverse relationship between managerial ownership concentration and firm 
size. The correlation between managerial ownership and firm size, measured as 
market value of equity, is -0.2859 at the 0.0005 significance level. This means 
that large restaurant firms usually have low managerial ownership concentration 
due to dispersed ownership structure. Alternatively, small firms show high 
managerial ownership percentage due to concentrated ownership structure. The 
same multiple regression analysis was performed for each group. Table 6 
summarizes the results of multiple regression conducted within each group.
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Table 6.
Variable Coefficients in M ultiple Regression Analysis for Each Group
G ro u p l Group2 G roups
MOP Size P /E MOP Size P /E MOP Size P /E
ATT -0.16 -0.22 1.40 -0.10 0.32 -0.66
OE 0.80** 0.10*** 0.81 0.23*** 0.15 0.21***
NPM 1.23*** 0.12*** 1.40** 0.20*** 0.09 0.11***
OR 0.79** 0.08*** 0.73 0.14*** 0.05 0.12**
ROA 2.09** 0.17*** 1.37** 0.21*** 0.05 0.14***
ROE 5.87*** 0.33*** 2.64** 0.33*** 0.11 0.26***
ROI 2.77** 0.23*** 2.23** 0.41*** 0.61* 0.20***
SR 2.40* 0.19** -0.12 0.13 0.26*** 0.37** 0.42 0.28** -0.17
Note. Simultaneous multiple regression was conducted. The tolerance level is 
higher than .9 in all performance measures.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .001.
Across all three groups, size is statistically significant and shows a 
positive relationship with all the performance measures except asset turnover. 
This result is consistent with the one using the entire sample. Managerial 
ownership, on the other hand, shows inconsistent relationship with performance 
measures across the groups. The significance level declines as the managerial 
ownership level increases. Managerial ownership in Group 1 shows a 
significant and positive relationship w ith OE, NPM, OR, ROA, ROE, ROI, and 
even with stock return (at the 0.1 level) which was not significant in the 
regression w ith the entire sample. This shows that increasing managerial 
ownership has a significant impact on performance in the group with the lowest 
managerial ownership range. Managerial ownership in Group 2 was found 
significantly and positively correlated with only four performance measures, 
NPM, ROA, ROE, and ROI. In Group 3, which contains firms w ith the highest 
m anagerial ownership range, only ROI is associated with managerial ownership
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at the 0.1 level. P /E  is statistically significant and positive in its correlation with 
stock return in Group 2. P /E  was not found to have any significant impact on 
stock return in the test using the entire sample.
The results of the group-wise analysis show that the impact of increasing 
managerial ownership on performance is more evident in large restaurant firms 
where ownership concentration is hard to achieve and managerial ownership 
percentage remains relatively low. In small restaurant firms where ownership 
concentration is easy to achieve and executives have already amassed a large 
percentage of shares, increasing managerial ownership is less likely to further 
improve performance.
The results of the group-wise analysis are similar to the results of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) that found the most significant association between 
managerial ownership and performance in the group with 0%-5% of managerial 
ownership range. The less strong association between managerial ownership 
and performance in Group 2 might be due to the "entrenchm ent effect" as 
discussed by Morck et al.(1988). However, the lack of association between 
managerial ownership and performance in Group 3, which has the largest 
managerial ownership concentration, contradicts the convergence-of-interest 
theory. A plausible cause of this lack of association is the underperformance of 
the small- size firms in this group. Small restaurant firms may be less 
competitive and hence underperform the large ones. The overall 
underperformance may have decreased or disallowed for observing the 
significant association between managerial ownership and performance in this
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
52
group. In addition to the size-performance factor, size-incentive factor may 
complement the explanation for this lack of association. While increasing the 
percentage of managerial ownership in Group 1, where firm size is relatively 
large, may render substantial incentives to executives, the same percentage 
increase in Group 3 with small market value may not be significant enough for 
executives to generate increased firm performance. The small-firm effect in 
Group 2 and Group 3 may have affected or dominated the convergence-of- 
interest effect and made the correlation between managerial ownership and 
performance less significant or insignificant.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
The agency theory views the separation of ownership and management as 
the cause of inefficiencies that arise from delegating authority to someone (an 
agent) who is not the owner. Managerial ownership was proposed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) as one of the solutions for reducing agency problems and 
increasing the convergence of interests between managers and shareholders. 
Despite the volume of the studies on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance, there has not been a conclusive result Most 
previous studies used multiple industries as a sample without controlling for 
possible industry effect or focused on single non-hospitality industry.
The primary purpose of the study, based on the agency theory, was to 
extend previous research on the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance to the restaurant industry by using a multiple regression 
analysis. 224 observations from the 146 restaurant firms were gathered for the 
period of 1995 and 1996. Based on the previous studies on the firm size effect 
and implicit association between firm size and executive compensation, the 
study added firm size as a control variable in investigating the relationship
53
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between managerial ownership and firm performance. Additionally, P /E  ratio 
was included as another control variable in examining stock performance 
because of its impact on stock return. Using various performance measures from 
asset utilization, operating efficiency, and profitability to stock return, the study 
found a significant and positive association between managerial ownership and 
all of the profitability and operating efficiency measures. The findings based on 
the entire sample of the study support the hypothesis that managerial ownership 
is a proxy for convergence of interests between managers and shareholders.
Firm size was found to be significantly associated w ith all of the performance 
measures except asset turnover. N either firm size nor managerial ownership has 
been found to be significantly related w ith asset turnover. The lack of 
association between managerial ownership and asset turnover- - a ratio of net 
sales divided by average total assets- -, and the significant association between 
all profitability ratios and managerial ownership imply that restaurant 
executives w ith high equity holdings in the firm are more profit-oriented rather 
than sales-oriented as Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested.
The secondary purpose of the study was to examine whether the degree 
of association between managerial ownership and performance varies across the 
firms w ith different levels of m anagerial ownership. The result revealed that 
such association is particularly strong in the group with 0%-15% managerial 
ownership. The result of the group-wise analysis is somewhat consistent with 
the one by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). The degree of significant 
association between managerial ownership and performance declines as the
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level of managerial ownership increases. The less significant association 
between managerial ownership and performance in the firms with high 
managerial holdings may have been affected by the underperformance of the 
small-size restaurant firms. In other words, the convergence-of-interest effect of 
managerial ownership in the firms with high managerial ownership may be lost 
in the shadow of a strong size effect
Implications of the Study
Based on the findings, the study offers three important implications for 
the restaurant industry. Motivation of executives is of vital importance in the 
restaurant industry as their ability, performance, and leadership are critical to 
the firm's survival, growth, and success in the highly competitive environm ent 
The significant and positive association between managerial ownership and firm 
performance found over the entire sample implies that restaurant firms may 
utilize managerial ownership as an incentive for executives to improve firm 
performance. With an offer of equity ownership, restaurant executives are more 
likely to be motivated to improve firm performance as their own wealth depends 
on the firm 's stock performance. Additionally, a sense of ownership and 
attachment to the firm derived from the offered equity ownership may help 
refrain executives from shirking, reduce unnecessary costs, and increase 
operating efficiency, thus, leading to improved profitability and operating 
efficiency.
Second, increasing managerial ownership may be used most effectively in 
the large restaurant firms, where relatively low managerial holdings were
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found, to improve performance and expand firm value. Small restaurant 
executives who already amassed a large percentage of managerial holdings may 
not be as motivated as those of large restaurant firms by increasing managerial 
ownership. However, this does not necessarily mean that increasing managerial 
ownership is not effective in the small firms. It rather suggests that, because of 
the size difference, the effect of increasing the percentage of managerial 
ownership in the small restaurant firms may not be as visible as that in the large 
firms. The size effect may, in part, have reduced the degree of significant 
association between managerial ownership and firm performance in the small 
firms with high managerial holdings.
Third, the strong and positive association between firm size and 
performance shows that large restaurant firms outperform small ones. The 
economy of scale, size privileges, and extensive compensations offered to the 
executives of large restaurant firms may have contributed to the positive 
association between firm size and performance. Many small restaurant firms in 
the sample were money-long companies. Small restaurant firms' 
underperformance and instability as reflected in the large performance gap 
between small and large restaurant firms suggest that the restaurant industry 
may enhance its overall performance by restructuring through merger and 
acquisition. Restaurant firms, through merger and acquisition, may take 
advantage of favorable outcomes such as obtaining lower costs of capital, 
achieving economies of scale particularly in such areas as advertising, 
marketing, and purchasing, and enhancing and improving management teams.
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Recommendations for Future Research
For future studies, it is suggested that a longer time frame be used so as to 
collect more data observations. A large number of observations would allow for 
a division into more sub-groups of managerial ownership in a group-wise 
analysis and, therefore, provide better insights of managerial holdings' impact 
on performance at different ownership ranges.
The two-variable (three-variable in the case of stock return as a dependent 
variable) regression model for the study was intended for examining the 
relationship between managerial ownership and performance rather than for 
predicting performance. The relatively low R square values of the regression 
models in Table 5 suggest that they cannot be used as predicative models.
Future studies can extend this model into a performance predicting model by 
adding more variables. In such a model, the type of operation and employee 
stock ownership may be added as predicting variables. Restaurant industry 
shows a w ide performance variability possibly due to diversified types of 
operation. This suggests that subcategorizing restaurant firms according to their 
type of operation may be necessary in investigating the impact of managerial 
ownership on firm performance. Considered that most quick-service restaurant 
firms run m ulti-unit operations and upscale restaurant firms run a limited 
number of units, categorization according to the type of operations may be used 
in place of firm size as a control variable. The additional variables can be also 
considered new control variables in examining the relationship between 
managerial ownership and performance. It would be interesting to see how
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additional variables would interact w ith managerial ownership to affect 
restaurant firms' performance.
Future studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance may extend the scope of study to the unit ownership. A recent 
industry trend shows that an increasing num ber of restaurant firms including 
Outback Steakhouse and Sonic Drive-Ins are offering the restaurant unit's top 
m anagem ent an opportunity of equity ownership. At last, the research 
methodology used in this study may be applied for investigating other service 
industry sectors.
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